25 November
2025 / current concerns
2-028
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FROM OCCUPY
NIGERIA TO QUIET STREETS: THE UNEVEN CIVIC REACTION TO SUBSIDY REMOVAL IN 2012
VS. 2023
by Dr. Uzodinma Adirieje, FAHOA
+2348034725905 (WhatsApp) / EMAIL: druzoadirieje2015@gmail.com
CEO/Programmes Director, Afrihealth Optonet Association
(AHOA) – CSOs Network and Think-tank
follow Dr. Uzodinma Adirieje on
Facebook by clicking on this link <https://www.facebook.com/uzoadirieje>
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INTRODUCTION
When the federal government announced the
removal of the fuel subsidy on 1 January 2012, Nigeria erupted. What became
known as “Occupy Nigeria” swept cities, campuses and social networks: human
barricades down highways, mass strikes organized by the labour movement, and
visible, sustained street pressure that forced the government to partially roll
back its decision within weeks. The 2012 mobilization combined traditional
union muscle with an emergent digital public sphere — a potent mix that made
the streets the primary theatre of dissent.
FAST-FORWARD TO 2023
President Bola Tinubu’s administration took
a decisive path on subsidy removal as part of a broader macroeconomic reform
package. Labour unions again cried foul and called strikes. There were
protests, meetings between the president and union leaders, and sporadic
marches. But the dramatic, paralyzing mass of 2012 — the long lines at petrol
stations, the near-universal closure of businesses, the sustained presence of
youth and workers across major cities — did not reappear in the same way. The
2023 agitation was more fragmented: industrial action and targeted
demonstrations replaced the sprawling “parliament of the streets” that defined
2012.
BUT WHY
Why did ostensibly similar shocks produce
such different civic trajectories? A web of social, political and structural
changes had reshaped the citizens’ calculus:
I. MEMORY OF 2012 ITSELF ALTERED
EXPECTATIONS
Occupy Nigeria delivered quick political
results — or at least visible government concessions — and it taught both
protesters and authorities lessons about leverage and limits. The state
strengthened preparedness, and parts of the protest ecosystem learned that
street pressure can produce short-term gains but not necessarily long-term
change. By 2023, many Nigerians judged that the battlefield had shifted:
protest might register anger, but it would not reliably reverse macroeconomic
policy. This institutional learning dampened the appetite for mass street
action.
II. SHIFT IN THE COMPOSITION AND CAPACITY
OF THE LEAD CIVIC ACTORS FROM 2012
In 2012, the Nigeria Labour Congress and
civil society groups provided coherent, cross-class leadership. Social media
amplified coordination in real time. Research on Occupy Nigeria has shown how
Facebook and Twitter were pivotal in messaging and mobilization. By 2023, the
labour movement was less cohesive, and civil society was fragmented by funding
gaps, state pressure, and competing priorities. Social media — while larger and
more sophisticated — had also been professionalized and polarized, eroding the organic,
cross-cutting networks that powered the earlier uprising.
III. REALITY OF ECONOMIC HARDSHIP ON PEOPLE’S
LIVES
Paradoxically, when deprivation becomes
chronic, citizens’ risk calculus changes. In 2012 many Nigerians still had the
capacity — socially and economically — to sustain mass demonstrations. A decade
of depreciation, inflation and repeated shocks left millions in 2023 with fewer
buffers. The cost of missing work, of losing a day’s earnings to stand in the
sun, became a deterrent. Mass action requires not just outrage but the material
bandwidth to act; when households are stretched, protest is one risk too many.
IV. STATE’S POSTURE AND SECURITY
ARCHITECTURE EVOLVED
After 2012 the state invested in
surveillance, crowd-control practices and rapid-response strategies. The
heavy-handed suppression of protests in some later episodes — sometimes with
tragic loss of life — sowed caution. Where 2012 felt like a popular uprising
with an unpredictable outcome, 2023 often felt like an arena where the state
had the upper hand. Reports around the 2023 protests documented arrests,
clashes and a more guarded public space, conditions that disincentivise large,
sustained street mobilization.
V. POLITICAL LEGITIMACY AND ELITE DYNAMICS
In 2012 the subsidy removal was framed by
many as a symptom of corruption and elite mismanagement; the protest cut across
party lines. By 2023, political alignments, patronage networks and fatigue with
party politics had reshaped the political terrain. Some who protested in 2012
had by 2023 been co-opted, disillusioned, or simply preoccupied with survival.
The fragmentation of political opposition and the absence of a unified,
credible alternative strategy for relief or reform left protest without a clear
endgame.
This uneven civic reaction carries lessons
for activists and policymakers alike. Movements must build durable
institutions, not episodic flare-ups; they must pair street pressure with
proposals that address both short-term relief and long-term structural reform.
Governments that intend to implement hard economic choices must do so
transparently, with targeted social protections that reduce the immediate pain
for the poorest. And for civil society and health actors — particularly those
concerned with social determinants of health and vulnerability — the task is to
craft responses that protect the most exposed households from policy shocks
that translate quickly into hunger, illness and lost livelihoods.
Occupy Nigeria showed the power of the
streets; the quieter, more fractured 2023 response shows the limits of
spectacle when structural vulnerabilities are deeper and institutional trust is
lower. For a resilient civic space capable of holding power to account — and
protecting ordinary citizens from the worst of economic adjustment — both
movement-builders and policymakers have work to do. The question now is whether
Nigeria will invest in the social contracts that allow painful reforms to be
legitimate, fair, and humane — or whether the next shock will produce an even
more brittle, and potentially more volatile, public reaction.
About this Writer:
Dr. Uzodinma Adirieje is an environmental health researcher with
Afrihealth Optonet Association (AHOA), focused on linking ecosystem health and
human well-being in Nigeria. He is a global health practitioner, development expert,
and civil society leader whose work sits at the critical nexus of biodiversity,
health, and climate change. He serves as the CEO of AHOA, a pan-African and
global South civil society network advancing sustainable development through
advocacy, policy dialogue, and grassroots interventions. With over two decades
of experience, Dr. Adirieje has championed the understanding that biodiversity
is essential for human health - supporting food security, disease regulation,
clean water, and resilient livelihoods. His leadership promotes integrated
approaches that address environmental degradation, climate change, and poverty
simultaneously. Through AHOA, he leads multi-country initiatives on climate
change, ecosystem restoration, renewable energy, universal health coverage, and
climate-smart agriculture, while advocating for stronger governance and
inclusive community participation. At national, regional, and global levels,
Dr. Adirieje engages with governments, international organizations, and civil
society to drive policies linking health and environment. His work underscores
that safeguarding biodiversity is not only an ecological necessity but also a
cornerstone of global health and sustainable development in Africa and the
Global South.
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